Razer
This weekend, safety researcher jonhat disclosed a long-standing safety bug within the Synapse software program related to Razer gaming mice. Throughout software program set up, the wizard produces a clickable hyperlink to the situation the place the software program will probably be put in. Clicking that hyperlink opens a File Explorer window to the proposed location—however that File Explorer spawns with SYSTEM course of ID, not with the consumer’s.
Have mouse, will root
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The “Set up Location” on the decrease proper is a clickable hyperlink that opens a File Explorer window to browse for non-standard areas.
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Proper-clicking the File Explorer window and deciding on “open powershell right here” or “open command immediate right here” will get you a shell.
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And what privileges does that shell have? The identical because the File Explorer Window, inherited from the installer dialog itself.
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We are able to see that the Razer installer was downloaded routinely by Home windows Replace when the mouse was plugged in.
By itself, this vulnerability in Razer Synapse appears like a minor subject—in spite of everything, to be able to launch a software program installer with SYSTEM privileges, a consumer would usually have to have Administrator privileges themselves. Sadly, Synapse is part of the Windows Catalog—which signifies that an unprivileged consumer can simply plug in a Razer mouse, and Home windows Replace will cheerfully obtain and run the exploitable installer routinely.
Jonhat is not the one—and even the primary—researcher to find and publicly disclose this bug. Lee Christensen publicly disclosed the identical bug in July, and in response to safety researcher _MG_, who demonstrated it utilizing an OMG cable to imitate the PCI Device ID of a Razer mouse and exploit the identical vulnerability, researchers have been reporting it fruitlessly for greater than a yr.
Vulnerability fixes coming quickly to a Home windows Catalog close to you
Fortunately, Razer appears to have lastly gotten the memo—jonhat reported that the corporate reached out to him shortly after his August 21 public disclosure to guarantee him that its safety workforce is “engaged on a repair ASAP,” and the corporate even provided him a bounty regardless of the general public disclosure.
As soon as Razer itself has patched the vulnerability, the following step will probably be pushing it to Microsoft for inclusion in Home windows Catalog—the place it might want to exchange the present and susceptible Razer HIDClass driver that Home windows Replace routinely downloads and runs each time a Razer mouse is plugged into the system. (The susceptible model within the Home windows Catalog as of publishing time is 6.2.9200.16495, dated January 2017.)
